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Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the process of taking another’s perspective.
Anthropomorphism can be seen as the extension of ToM to non-human entities. This
review examines the literature concerning ToM and anthropomorphism in relation to
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), specifically addressing the questions
of how and why those on the spectrum both show an increased interest for
anthropomorphism and may even show improved ToM abilities when judging the mental
states of anthropomorphic characters. This review highlights that while individuals with
ASD traditionally show deficits on a wide range of ToM tests, such as recognizing facial
emotions, such ToM deficits may be ameliorated if the stimuli presented is cartoon or
animal-like rather than in human form. Individuals with ASD show a greater interest
in anthropomorphic characters and process the features of these characters using
methods typically reserved for human stimuli. Personal accounts of individuals with
ASD also suggest they may identify more closely with animals than other humans. It
is shown how the social motivations hypothesized to underlie the anthropomorphizing
of non-human targets may lead those on the spectrum to seek social connections and
therefore gain ToM experience and expertise amongst unlikely sources.
Keywords: anthropomorphism, autism, theory of mind, social cognition, perspective taking, mentalizing, animals
INTRODUCTION
It took me a long time to figure out that I see things about animals other people don’t. And it wasn’t
until I was in my forties that I finally realized I had one big advantage over the feedlot owners who
were hiring me to manage their animals: being autistic. Autism made school and social life hard, but
it made animals easy (Grandin and Johnson, 2009, p. 1).
Anthropomorphism is the ascription of human features to non-human entities (Epley et al.,
2007), and it often occurs when non-human entities are perceived as behaving both intentionally
and unpredictably (Waytz et al., 2010b). Perhaps one reason individuals are more likely to
anthropomorphize entities that are unpredictable is that human behavior can be equally difficult
to predict, governed by a complex system of non-observable cognitions, beliefs, and motivations
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Luckily, early in life we learn to attend to nuances in behavior that
allow for an intrinsic tracking of other’s intentions (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005). Thus, when
non-human entities behave invariably, we reflexively attempt to make sense of that behavior, by
tracing it back to a particular goal or purpose.
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The act of delineating a person’s goal or purpose involves using
theory of mind (ToM). ToM is a form of social cognition that
refers to the ascription and recognition of thoughts, emotions
and beliefs to the self and others and the ability to recognize
that another’s perspective is different from our own (Baron-
Cohen, 1999). When people ponder the goals or motivations of
non-human entities, they are essentially using ToM. Humanizing
the behavior of non-human entities is a pathway toward using
ToM to understand the entity’s motivations or intentions, thus
anthropomorphism and ToM are closely connected (Epley et al.,
2007). Areas of the brain such as the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), which activates in accordance with ToM, also activates
when anthropomorphizing (Chaminade et al., 2007) and when
rationalizing the behavior of both humans and animals (Spunt
et al., 2017). Additionally, the more a person anthropomorphizes,
the larger the areas of the brain that are responsible for ToM
processing (Cullen et al., 2014), highlighting the connection
between anthropomorphism and ToM.
There is some evidence that ToM and, by association,
anthropomorphism, reflect a more general predictive strategy
people use to process unpredictability in the environment,
independent of any one agent’s human-like properties, called
predictive encoding (Friston and Frith, 2015). For instance, in
the “uncanny valley,” when a stimuli is presented as human, such
as a humanoid robot, yet their behavior is too predictable or
mechanical, numerous error signals are transmitted, and as a
result it is difficult to predict the robot’s actions (Saygin et al.,
2012). Thus, at its most basic level, it is likely that ToM, and
in turn anthropomorphism, is triggered through a more general
recognition of behavioral patterns through a process of predictive
encoding.
However, it is also true that anthropomorphism is not
simply the mind engaging in more general predictive strategies,
but involves applying a specifically human schema to better
understand non-human agents. This process can be observed
when individuals take the Social Attribution Task, in which
people increasingly attribute human behavioral patterns to
animated shapes (Heider and Simmel, 1944). By humanizing
non-human agents, individuals are better equipped to utilize
familiar predictive encoding strategies. As people have extensive
knowledge of the types of goals that underlie such behaviors
in human agents, the more one humanizes for example an
unpredictable gadget, the easier it becomes to predict the gadget’s
future behavior (Waytz et al., 2010b). This helps explain why,
in contrast, dehumanizing an agent, such as the robot in the
“uncanny valley,” leads to particularly strong predictive encoding
disruption (Saygin et al., 2012).
Arguably the largest store of knowledge about human
agency comes from an understanding of one’s own behavioral
antecedents and outcomes, which can aid in the representation
of what may underlie a person’s actions. Humphrey (1984)
refers to this as “reflexive consciousness” or the ability to
map the externalizing behaviors of others onto the internal
experience of the self. Evidence for reflexive consciousness within
the brain has come through the discovery of a mirror neural
network, which elicits the activation of one’s own motoric brain
regions even when only passively viewing the actions of others
(Kohler et al., 2002), as well as a “default network” in cortical
midline structures of the brain, which activates in relation to both
self-related and socially related thoughts (Uddin et al., 2007).
Both networks reveal the important role self-conceptualization
plays when both processing other’s actions and representing their
mental states.
Therefore, it is likely that one reason people
anthropomorphize is that they are not only “humanizing”
an unfamiliar agent, but more specifically they are personalizing
the agent to activate self-representations and simulate the
other’s experience. Thus, it is not surprising that a critical effect
following ToM and anthropomorphic engagement with another
includes perceiving that agent as more similar to the self (Epley
et al., 2007), in addition to viewing them more empathically
(Waytz et al., 2010a), and displaying a greater desire to interact
with them in socially desirable ways (Waytz et al., 2010a). As we
develop expertise in using ToM to predict the actions of others,
and even ourselves, we become most capable of understanding
non-human agents by attributing human motivations to their
behaviors, therefore giving rise to anthropomorphism (Waytz
et al., 2010b). But what if a person does not develop such an
interest and expertise in human cognition? What if they struggle
to self-reference? Can they anthropomorphize?
Such questions are particularly pertinent with regard to
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), a condition in which affected
individuals show, in comparison to those who are neurotypical
(NT), deficits in ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Kana et al.,
2015), poor self-referential cognition (Lombardo et al., 2007),
decreased mirror neural activity (Oberman et al., 2005) and
weakened connections within the default network (Weng et al.,
2010), all of which are mechanisms conjectured to play an
intrinsic role in anthropomorphizing. As will be explored
throughout this review, despite these differences, which would
presumably contribute to a particularly weakened ability to
anthropomorphize, individuals with ASD appear to display
an affinity for anthropomorphism and an even stronger
performance on ToM tasks when agents are non-human.
Explanations for relative strengths within this population in
relation to the processing of anthropomorphic ToM will be
discussed.
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that affects approximately
1 in 68 individuals Christensen et al. (2016). Those affected
possess atypical social and communicative styles, and restricted,
repetitive behaviors and interests (American Psychiatric
Association, [APA], 2013). Some believe that these two
symptoms are somewhat separable (Brunsdon and Happé,
2014), as individuals with ASD often have significant variation
in symptom profiles (Geschwind and Levitt, 2007). There are
several prominent theories commonly used to explain the
mechanisms believed to underpin ASD. Among them are the
Empathizing/Systemizing theory (Baron-Cohen, 2009), the
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory (Mottron et al., 2006),
and the Social Motivation theory (Chevallier et al., 2012). These
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three theories largely center upon the hypothesized mechanisms
which underlie the social and perceptual differences found in
ASD, each will now be briefly explored.
The Empathizing/Systemizing theory of ASD is comprised
of two elements; an empathetic/ToM deficit and a penchant
toward systematic stimuli conforming to rule-based logic, such as
numbers or mechanical objects (Baron-Cohen, 2009). Evidence
of empathy deficits within ASD include cognitive difficulties such
as failure to pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985),
and affective impairments such as reduced ability to process facial
emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), or poor automatic tracking
of non-verbal cues (Schuwerk et al., 2015).
The systemizing element of the theory refers to the ability
to understand and use rule-based reasoning or logic, which
Baron-Cohen (2009) connects with an increased competence
those with ASD often demonstrate in domains such as science
and mathematics. However, as understanding social systems
requires more “gestalt” or holistic interpretations, a penchant
for systemizing may impede development in other areas. Indeed,
research suggests that tendencies toward empathizing and
systemizing have a strong inverse relationship in clinical samples
(Grove et al., 2013), indicating that those with ASD may be
approaching empathy tasks systematically. However, as will be
highlighted in this review, several studies show those on the
spectrum do not have a global deficit toward empathizing, as this
theory suggests, and this ability is intact when social stimuli is
anthropomorphic rather than human.
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning Theory (EPF) (Mottron
et al., 2006) argues that people with ASD can indeed process
globally, even at times showing strengths relative to controls
(Perreault et al., 2011). However, it is hypothesized that
the heightened perceptual sensitivities to lower order stimuli
demonstrated by superior visual acuity (Gliga et al., 2015),
sensitivity to musical pitch (Bonnel et al., 2003), motion
perception (Foss-Feig et al., 2013) and even tactile sensitivity (for
a review see Ben-Sasson et al., 2009), may lead to significant
processing differences which may have downstream effects. For
instance, as those with ASD show a diminished sensitivity to
complex stimuli (Bertone et al., 2005; Boer et al., 2013) it may be
that they increasingly rely on their enhanced lower-level sensory
perception and thus struggle updating their processing strategies
(Zaidel et al., 2015).
Heightened discriminatory abilities in relation to low-level
object features in a domain (i.e., pitch, letters, digits or 2-D visuo-
perceptual properties), may also underlie the circumscribed
interests (CIs) in relation to a defined class of units often found
to exist in this population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). CIs in
ASD have been found to be particularly intense, interfering,
and idiosyncratic compared to NTs (Anthony et al., 2013).
The role of CIs in ASD with regards to processing advantages
and disadvantages are themselves somewhat paradoxical in this
population. For one, a person with ASD’s exposure to areas
related to CIs can in many instances lead to “savant” type abilities
in which a person shows extreme talent in relation to knowledge
of a particular domain (Happé and Frith, 2010). However,
research indicates that the presence of CI related stimuli can
divert attention from social stimuli, and increase perseverative
behaviors (Sasson et al., 2008). Some research indicates that in
certain situations, such as when both a NT peer and child with
ASD are interacting in relation to the child’s CI, such as playing
with a toy boat or plane, social initiation is enhanced (Boyd et al.,
2007). Children with ASD have also been shown to be more likely
to follow another’s social gaze when directed toward CI stimuli
(Thorup et al., 2017). This indicates that while CIs can divert
social attention in this population, they can also be mechanisms
for inducing positive social behaviors.
It has also been conjectured that the heightened sensory
perception, and the presence of CIs, may carry a specifically
social cost to those with the condition (Unruh et al., 2016). The
Social Motivation Theory (SM) of ASD (Chevallier et al., 2012),
argues that the population’s empathy and perceptual differences
may arise through a reduced neurohormonal “reward” typically
experienced when interacting socially with others (Chaminade
et al., 2015a). Instead, stimuli representing restricted interests
have been shown to activate reward circuitry usually stimulated
through social contact (Grelotti et al., 2005; Foss-Feig et al., 2016).
While causality is difficult to infer, those that prescribe to
a “social first” model of ASD believe that the enhanced ability
to discriminate lower level stimuli may in part develop due to
an absence of typical social development, such as the ability to
engage in joint attention (Mundy et al., 2009). As young children
with ASD are impaired in joint attention in the first years of life
(Charman, 2003), and as joint attention is thought to underlie
ToM (Sodian and Kristen-Antonow, 2015), it may be that lower
level perceptual strengths develop in place of skills such as ToM
which develop through more social learning methods.
Subsequent difficulties with skills like ToM have been shown
to longitudinally impair social functioning and peer relations
(Banerjee et al., 2011), and thus poor ToM may negatively
influence a person with ASD’s motivation later in life to engage
in social interactions. Research indicates that adults with ASD,
have been shown to experience increased rates of loneliness,
depression and anxiety, and cite social reasoning difficulties as
a significant source of their isolation (Jobe and Williams White,
2007). Thus, an aspect of SM theory involves the possibility that
decreased social reward processing may be in part a downstream
consequence of the negative social experiences those with ASD
symptoms often endure (Wood and Gadow, 2010).
Both the increased salience of lower level stimuli, particularly
those that align with circumscribed interests (CI), and the
decreased salience of non-systematic, social stimuli that may
impact social motivation (SM), could help explain why
people with ASD often have difficulties using ToM, which
necessitates gestalt processing through complex modalities (for
instance nonverbal body language coupled with explicit vocal
communication), and socially directed attention (Frith and Frith,
2006). As ToM deficits have been shown to persist throughout
development (Schneider et al., 2013) and correspond heavily
to ASD symptom severity (Hoogenhout and Malcolm-Smith,
2017), it is an important mechanism for understanding ASD
symptomology and trajectory. As research indicates that current
ToM interventions demonstrate poor transfer into real life
settings (Marraffa and Araba, 2016), finding ways in which
ToM may be intrinsically rewarding to those with ASD, such as
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through anthropomorphism, could be a vital tool for researchers
and community stakeholders alike. The ability and affinity to
anthropomorphize in those with ASD will be explored in relation
to the above theories throughout the remainder of this review.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND ASD
There is some evidence that people with ASD, despite ToM
deficits in relation to human stimuli, have intact or even
enhanced ToM processing in relation to anthropomorphic
stimuli, a claim which will be explored in more detail in
subsequent sections. Theoretically, there are several reasons why
such improvements may exist, and these will be discussed in
connection with the three tenants of anthropomorphism from
the Epley et al. (2007) model.
In the first tenet of the Epley et al. (2007) anthropomorphism
model it is stated that individuals are more likely to
anthropomorphize when they have an increased motivation
for sociability. Support for this comes from research showing
individuals with increased levels of loneliness are more likely to
anthropomorphize pets (Epley et al., 2007), robots (Lee et al.,
2006), and even smart phones (Wang, 2017). Research indicates
that people with ASD are particularly vulnerable to loneliness
and thus the anthropomorphizing of non-human agents may
function as a social outlet of sorts. For instance, adults with a
high degree of ASD related traits were found to be no different
than controls in their desire for companionship, but reported
significantly higher ratings of loneliness which they attributed
to their lack of social understanding (Jobe and Williams White,
2007). Evidence of fewer social networks (Mazurek, 2014), along
with an increased perception of the self as a poor social actor
(Vickerstaff et al., 2007) may contribute to the elevated levels
of social anxiety present within the population (for a review
see MacNeil et al., 2009). As social differences may isolate
those with ASD from peers and/or result in negative outcomes,
anthropomorphizing non-human entities may allow for social
engagement with less emotional risk. In this way, interactions
with anthropomorphic characters may become more socially
motivating, in line with SM theory.
In the second Epley et al. (2007) tenet, individuals are found to
increasingly anthropomorphize a non-human entity to increase
efficacy, and a desire for efficacy is heightened when the non-
human’s behavior is increasingly unpredictable. One reason why
individuals with ASD may increasingly anthropomorphize to
increase efficacy is that properties of non-human creatures may
map onto CIs, and are thus intrinsically rewarding to those with
the condition (Dichter et al., 2010). Indeed, there have been
several reported cases of children with ASD having restricted
interests in relation to cartoons and animals (Grelotti et al.,
2005; South et al., 2005; Turner-Brown et al., 2011), and in
this way anthropomorphism may stem from a desire to increase
efficacy in their restricted area of expertise. Additionally, the
exaggerated physical appearance and motion of animals (Borgi
and Cirulli, 2016) and cartoons (Rhodes et al., 1987) may
heighten the perception of unpredictability in such agents, which
leads to a desire for increased efficacy. Conversely, more nuanced
behavioral cues indicating unpredictability when in human form,
such as subtle changes in facial expression or gaze direction, may
be more easily overlooked by those with ASD (Rump et al., 2009).
Lastly, in the third tenet, it is suggested that anthropo-
morphism is enhanced through the elicitation of agent
knowledge, which often includes perceiving similarities between
the self and the other. Individuals with ASD have been shown
to have a diminished physical sense of self (Lombardo et al.,
2010), and are also less sensitive to the physical irregularities of
non-human agents (Kuriki et al., 2016; Kumazaki et al., 2017).
Thus, it may be that a diminished physical sense of self allows
individuals with ASD to view themselves in less human and more
anthropomorphic ways, a viewpoint suggested in experiential
accounts by those with the condition (Prince-Hughes, 2004).
Thus, the increased social processing of anthropomorphic versus
human agents in socially typical ways may reflect an elicitation of
personal knowledge in relation to non-human entities through a
processing of the self as “other than human” (Bergenmar et al.,
2015).
To assess these claims, research investigating elements of
social processing in individuals with ASD regarding human
versus anthropomorphic stimuli will be explored. Processing
of anthropomorphic versus human face and motion processing
will first be discussed. Secondly, this review will explore how
increased engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli can lead to
ToM gains, along with a discussion of ASD interventions utilizing
anthropomorphic engagement through animal and cartoon-
based interventions. Finally, possible explanations for enhanced
anthropomorphic interest, engagement, and social processing
will be presented along with implications for practitioners and
future research directions.
ANTHROPOMORPHIC VERSUS HUMAN
FACE PROCESSING
In this section, two one of the underlying mechanisms for
understanding ToM, face processing and attention to eye gaze,
will be examined. Aspects of face processing that differ in
NTs and those with ASD are first discussed, along with the
possible mechanisms driving these differences. Next, several
studies are presented that demonstrate intact face processing
in this population in relation to anthropomorphic characters,
specifically cartoons, androids, and animals. Explanations for this
differential processing are discussed along with implications for
understanding ToM in this population.
TYPICAL VERSUS ATYPICAL FACE
PROCESSING
One of the integral components of ToM is conjecturing what a
person is thinking by processing what their face is expressing
(Baron-Cohen and Cross, 1992). It is thought that individuals
begin to hone this ability immediately following birth, as infants
are particularly interested in protofaces, or indistinct face-like
shapes (Johnson et al., 1991), and can immediately mimic facial
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expressions (Meltzoff, 1999). However, prolonged exposure to
familiar faces as “special” stimuli are likely responsible for the
preference young children develop toward species-specific faces
(Sugita, 2008), which in time develops into an expertise for
species-specific facial recognition and facial emotion processing
(Scherf et al., 2007).
Infants at risk for ASD have been shown to also orient
toward faces, contrary to popular conceptions of ASD stemming
from a nascent decreased social interest (Elsabbagh et al., 2013).
Interestingly, de Klerk et al. (2014) found that at 7 months
of age, infants at risk for ASD spent longer than is typical
gazing at faces, yet surprisingly this was longitudinally linked
to poorer facial recognition abilities. Thus, it was conjectured
that the prolonged gazing at faces in infants at risk for ASD
reflected piece-meal rather than holistic processing, meaning that
rather than processing faces as “special” stimuli, they may have
been processing them more in line with detailed objects. This
may explain why NT children at age two have been found to
be better able to differentiate human versus monkey faces, yet
children with ASD do not develop this ability until 3–4 years of
age (Chawarska and Volkmar, 2007). These differences suggest
that while young children with ASD may gaze for longer at
faces, they are not processing faces in a way that leads to
typical facial recognition gains, which itself relies on holistic
processing (Richler et al., 2011b). However, as will be discussed,
it may be that those with ASD have developed an ability
to process anthropomorphic faces in typical ways, which has
implications for elucidating the social processing mechanisms in
this population.
HOLISTIC ANTHROPOMORPHIC FACE
PROCESSING
It is conjectured that aspects of ToM depend on the ability
to holistically process faces, allowing people to rapidly detect
what may be a nuanced change in facial expression and to
recognize familiar agents. To achieve this, individuals are thought
to holistically compare a person’s face with a facial prototype,
which allows for the distinct properties of a face to become
salient (Farah et al., 1998). A significant body of research
suggests that individuals with ASD show both qualitative and
quantitative differences in the way they holistically process
human faces (Tang et al., 2015). For instance, in a study by
Pavlova et al. (2017), individuals with ASD were asked to
process images of food which were arranged to look like faces.
Unlike typically developed individuals, those with ASD showed
significant difficulty recognizing that the food was arranged to
look like a face, indicating a detailed, piece-meal interpretation
of the stimuli.
One method for measuring holistic face processing is to
measure the facial inversion effect, which refers to the significant
difficulty NTs display when processing inverted rather than
upright faces (Leder and Bruce, 2000), indicating disruption
when a face does not conform to its typical configural pattern
(Richler et al., 2011a). Research indicates that individuals with
ASD show a decreased inversion effect when viewing human
faces (Falck-Ytter, 2008; Senju et al., 2008; Vida et al., 2013).
However, there are several studies indicating that individuals
with ASD may demonstrate the inversion effect when faces
are anthropomorphic, indicating that they are processing them
holistically.
For instance, an investigation by Rosset et al. (2008) tested
facial emotion recognition in children with ASD and NT controls
using both cartoon drawings and human photographs of inverted
and upright faces. They found that NT children showed the
inversion effect for both cartoon and human faces, meaning that
their holistic facial representations were significantly disrupted
when both types of stimuli were inverted. However, individuals
with ASD did not show this effect when viewing inverted human
faces; instead, they demonstrated the inversion effect only when
processing cartoon faces.
Interestingly, follow up research by Rosset et al. (2010) again
tested the inversion effect in cartoon versus human faces, but
this time participants were asked to discriminate facial features
of stimuli. Results showed that NT participants demonstrated
the inversion effect only when viewing human faces. In contrast,
participants with ASD did not show a preference for either real or
cartoon faces, performing equally in each condition, and showing
a reduced inversion effect compared to controls. Together, these
results illustrate a trend in which anthropomorphizing social
stimuli can at times be advantageous for those with ASD. While
anthropomorphism does not always lead to processing gains, as
shown in Rosset et al. (2010), non-human presentation does not
appear to interfere with ASD processing patterns.
As individuals with ASD have been shown to report a
heightened engagement with cartoons (Kuo et al., 2014), it may
be that the cartoon rather than human inversion effect reflects
a greater degree of elicited agent knowledge in relation to this
kind of stimuli. For instance, research indicates that the inversion
effect is significantly strengthened when individuals view faces
reflective of their own age and race (Ding et al., 2014), indicating
that elicited agent knowledge enhances the anthropomorphism
of similar facial stimuli. Additionally, the lack of inversion effect
toward human faces may reflect a decreased anthropomorphizing
of human faces, possibly due to a decreased ability to elicit
agent knowledge in relation to humans. This is surprising,
as individuals with ASD undoubtedly have significantly more
experience with humans. However, as the Epley et al. (2007)
model also posits, a desire for sociality interacts with the
elicitation of agent knowledge. Thus, it may be that decreased
salience for human faces, due to a possible social disengagement
with human faces, does not interfere with cartoon processing.
In the following section, research in ASD demonstrating intact
processing of anthropomorphic rather than human faces will be
discussed in relation to neural evidence.
FUSIFORM FACE AREA (FFA)
One mechanism implicated in the holistic processing of faces
is an acquired activation in the fusiform face area (FFA) when
viewing facial stimuli. The FFA is a brain region located in
the right hemisphere, where “holistic” processing is thought to
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occur, and this region is notably activated when NT individuals
view faces (Carlei et al., 2017). However, as shown in research
testing individuals with particular areas of expertise, it can
also activate when a person views various non-face stimuli of
significant personal interest and experience (Tarr and Gauthier,
2000). Evidence will now be discussed which shows activation
in the FFA in response to anthropomorphic rather than human
stimuli, which provides further evidence that individuals with
ASD may have differentially developed anthropomorphic rather
than human expertise.
Research on brain regions such as the fusiform gyrus (FG),
which houses the FFA, indicates that the development of facial
expertise develops over time. For instance, in children ages five
to eight the FG has been shown to be sensitive to objects, but
not faces; however, this pattern reverses by the time children
reach 11–14 (Scherf et al., 2007). By early to mid-adolescence,
the volume of the FG has significantly increased, and this volume
is correlated with a person’s ability to recognize and remember
faces (Golarai et al., 2007). It is thought that the developed
activation of the FG, and in particular the FFA, in response
to faces corresponds to an increased necessity to sensitively
processing facial information, leading adolescents and adults to
become face reading “experts” (Gauthier et al., 2000b). This is
significant regarding ToM, as a developed expertise in facial
recognition allows for nuanced interpretations when reading
emotional expressions (Schmitgen et al., 2016). Individuals with
ASD have been shown to demonstrate hypoactivation in the FG
and FFA when looking at specifically human faces (Dawson et al.,
2005; Humphreys et al., 2008; Pierce and Redcay, 2008). However,
the volume of the FG in individuals with ASD is not smaller
than NT counterparts, which implies that alternative stimuli may
instead activate this region (Whyte et al., 2016).
It may be that FG activity is less impaired, or even intact, in
individuals with ASD when social stimuli are anthropomorphic
rather than purely human, particularly when stimuli represent a
restricted interest. Grelotti et al. (2005) measured FFA activation
in a child and adolescent with ASD, one with a heightened interest
in the cartoon Digimon, and one without, along with a NT
child. During a visual recognition task, participants were shown
pictures featuring familiar human faces, unfamiliar human
faces, cartoon characters from the show Digimon, and common
objects. While the NT participant experienced activation in
the FFA only when viewing human faces, the participant with
ASD who watched Digimon showed FFA activation only when
viewing pictures of Digimon. The participant with ASD without
a preference for Digimon showed hypoactivation in the FFA
when viewing both faces and Digimon, and instead showed the
greatest amount of activation when viewing common objects.
This suggests that familiar stimuli related to restricted interests
may preferentially recruit the FFA in individuals with ASD, in
contrast to human facial stimuli.
Interestingly, research testing ASD participant responses to
non-familiar anthropomorphic faces, which may have been,
at best, only tangentially related to restricted interests, have
also been shown to elicit FFA activation. Jung et al. (2016)
measured the neural responses of children with ASD and controls
when viewing unfamiliar robot and human faces. Researchers
were interested in examining whether robot or human stimuli
activated the left hemifield of the brain, where the FFA is
located. Results showed that control subjects showed increased
activation when gazing at both human and robot faces, indicating
activation in the FFA. In contrast, children with ASD only showed
left hemifield activity when looking at robot faces and showed
hypoactivation in response to human faces.
Whyte et al. (2016), measured FFA activation when
adolescents with ASD and controls viewed images of unfamiliar
human faces, unfamiliar animal faces (cats and dogs), and
common objects. NT participants showed equal activation of
the FFA when looking at human and animal faces, in line with
research which suggests that in the NT population, human and
animal faces are processed similarly (Schirmer et al., 2013). In
contrast, those with ASD showed significant hypoactivation
when processing human faces. However, those with ASD showed
equivalent FFA activation for animal faces, in line with controls,
and neither group showed activation when viewing objects.
These findings were surprising considering research indicating
aberrant gaze behaviors (Guillon et al., 2014) and poor emotional
recognition (Gross, 2004) in young children with ASD when
viewing both human and animal faces, and activation only in
response to common objects when an item is not a specific
restricted interest (Grelotti et al., 2005).
All three of these studies may offer support for the role of CIs
in ToM for those with ASD, which contends that atypical stimuli
may elicit activation in the brain typically reserved for social
processing. For instance, the findings produced by Grelotti et al.
(2005), which showed FFA activation in response to a preferred
cartoon, could be seen as evidence that in ASD the FFA is engaged
by restricted interests rather than faces. Similarly, increased FFA
activation toward robot faces shown in Jung et al. (2016) may
also reflect a heightened response toward a restricted interest, as
individuals with ASD have been shown to have a fascination with
mechanical systems (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).
However, FFA activation in response to unfamiliar animal
faces, as demonstrated by Whyte et al. (2016) and to a certain
extent the unfamiliarity with the robot faces present in Jung
et al. (2016), are not as easily explained by CIs. For one, in the
Grelotti et al. (2005) study, participants were shown either human
faces or whole-body representations of Digimon characters. In
contrast, in both Jung et al. (2016) and Whyte et al. (2016) only
facial stimuli was visible to participants. Thus, the whole-body
details visible to the participant in Grelotti et al. (2005) could
have led to increased focus on tertiary aspects of the cartoon
that were of restricted interest. The focus on facial stimuli only
in Jung et al. (2016) and Whyte et al. (2016), however, limited
the ability for participants to focus on aspects of the stimuli
that may form a restricted interest category (mechanics, animals)
which suggests that activation occurred in response to what were
specifically faces. Furthermore, in contrast to one participant’s
known interest and familiarity with the Digimon stimuli used
by Grelotti et al. (2005), the images used in the other studies
were unfamiliar to participants. As evidence suggests that only
items relating to specific restricted interests elicit affective neural
responses in those with ASD (Cascio et al., 2014), the decreased
likelihood that the participants in each of the two study samples
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possessed a restricted interest underlying their engagement with
the animal or robot faces presents an alternative to the CI
account.
Together, these studies provide some evidence that individuals
with ASD may typically process anthropomorphic rather
than human faces, and that the mechanisms underlying
this processing be may not be entirely attributable to CIs.
This is of interest when forming accounts of ASD, as it
suggests that the FFA can be recruited toward general facial
processing in this population, particularly when they take a
non-human form. This may stem from a possible negative
association toward specifically human faces, which has ties to
SM. More broadly, these studies also form implications for
accounts of anthropomorphism, as it is commonly assumed
that anthropomorphism extends from a primarily human
representation (Waytz et al., 2010b). In individuals with ASD
however, it appears that anthropomorphism occurs in spite
of despite a disengagement with human representations. With
regard to the third tenet of anthropomorphism by Epley et al.
(2007), this may mean that the anthropomorphizing of non-
human faces, indicative of facial recognition related FG activity,
better elicits agent knowledge in this population. In other words,
individuals with ASD increasingly anthropomorphize when
agents are human-like and are less inclined to anthropomorphize
agents that are strictly human, possibly indicating a closer
identification with anthropomorphic creatures.
EYE GAZE
It is hypothesized that while the holistic processing of faces is a
fundamental aspect of facial recognition (Gauthier et al., 2000a),
it is the changeable interior aspects of the face may be the most
informative of a person’s mental state (Hoffman and Haxby,
2000). Eyes are arguably the most important facial features used
for both mental state interpretation (Peterson and Eckstein, 2012)
and are particularly implicated in facial recognition (Schyns et al.,
2002).
Individuals with ASD have been shown to display marked
differences in their attention to eyes compared to NT
counterparts, which may be a crucial element of subsequent ToM
impairments. For instance, studies have shown that individuals
with ASD spend significantly less time attending to eyes when
looking at faces (Riby and Hancock, 2009), and attend more to
lower regions of the face, such as the mouth (Jones et al., 2008).
Both tendencies are often cited as factors leading to their reduced
ability to read emotions in eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Senju
and Johnson, 2009). Researchers such as Tanaka and Sung (2016)
have put forth the “eye avoidance” theory of ASD, in which they
posit that a lack of eye gaze is due to a heightened emotional
arousal in response to eyes. Support for this theory can be found
in Kliemann et al. (2012), who showed that individuals with ASD
did not simply display an increased fixation toward lower facial
elements such as the mouth, but rather an increased avoidance of
eyes.
It is also hypothesized that a reduced oxytocin neurohormonal
release in response to human co-actors in individuals with ASD
(Chaminade et al., 2015a) may make eye contact too sensitizing,
as one of the purposes of oxytocin is to reduce anxiety during
social engagement (Kosfeld et al., 2005). As research has also
found that an administration of oxytocin attenuates neural
reactivity when viewing eyes with threatening expressions (Kanat
et al., 2015), and promotes eye gaze in individuals with and
without ASD (Auyeung et al., 2015), it may be that those with the
condition possess weakened neurohormonal priming networks
which make eye contact both efficient and rewarding.
Critically, while gazing at human eyes may be uncomfortable
for individuals with ASD, as is commonly reported by those
with the condition (Grandin and Panek, 2013), this may not
extend to anthropomorphic eyes. For instance, Grandgeorge
et al. (2016), compared the gaze patterns of NT children and
those with ASD when viewing pictures of human, dog, cat
and horse faces. While NT children spent more time looking
at eyes in general compared to children with ASD, they spent
the most time looking at human eyes. In contrast, children
with ASD spent the most time looking at the eyes of dogs
and cats and spent the least amount of time looking at human
eyes. Saitovitch et al. (2013) also produced similar findings.
Children were assessed on their eye gaze patterns when looking
at movies with cartoon and human characters. While children
with ASD looked significantly less at human eyes compared
to controls, they, in contrast, spent an equivalent amount of
time looking at cartoon eyes. In this way, it may be that while
eye gaze never reaches commensurate levels when compared
to NT counterparts, eyes may be more salient when they are
anthropomorphic.
These findings may provide support for both the SM and
CI aspects of ASD. For instance, with regard to CI, both
animals and cartoons may pertain to a restricted interest for the
individuals with ASD, which would explain longer looking times
toward these stimuli. However, as these studies indicate increased
attention toward anthropomorphic eyes, in particular, it may be
that this type of stimuli does not result in the same degree of
emotional dysregulation when returning the gaze and is thus
more motivating (SM).
In summary, it appears that individuals with ASD are more
likely to anthropomorphize human-like rather than human faces.
The three tenets of anthropomorphism outlined in Epley et al.
(2007) may support this claim. For one, a need for sociality
may cause individuals with ASD to see the social aspects of
anthropomorphic characters in typical ways, and this same desire
for sociality is not present to the same extent when stimuli are
human. Second, it may be that a motivation to fully understand
anthropomorphic creatures has led to typical face processing
patterns with regard to these stimuli, particularly in studies
demonstrating more typical gaze behaviors toward cartoon and
animal eyes. As eyes are the most communicative of mental
states, it may be that an increased interest in effectance with
anthropomorphic stimuli motivates individuals with ASD to gaze
at these types of eyes, while an interest in effectance is weakened
when an agent is human. Third, it may be that disruptions of
self-representations (Lombardo and Baron-Cohen, 2011), have
developed into a greater affinity for human-like rather than
human stimuli.
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The next section will focus on another foundation of ToM
processing, the detection, and recognition of biological motion.
There is a significant body of research exploring biological
motion recognition in ASD, which has largely concluded that
from an early age individuals with the condition are not as
sensitive to the movements of human agents. As will be discussed,
this sensitivity may be intact relative to controls when individuals
with ASD view anthropomorphic biological motion, particularly
as development progresses.
BIOLOGICAL MOTION PROCESSING
While there are several reasons why anthropomorphic faces may
be particularly salient to individuals with ASD, research indicates
that anthropomorphic motion may also lead to enhanced social
processing. An important element of ToM processing involves
the recognition and processing of biological motion (Koster-
Hale and Saxe, 2013), which contributes to the perception of
sentient animacy, such as the smooth movements of a human
as opposed to the jerky, artificial movements of a robot (Freitag
et al., 2008). For instance, studies using point-light displays
have demonstrated that by only showing several animated points
meant to represent limbic movement, individuals are sensitive
to points that are analogous with the human body (Johansson,
1973).
One reason that biological motion is salient and informative
with regard to ToM is that recognizing it enhances a person’s
ability to make predictions about agent behavior (Koster-Hale
and Saxe, 2013). For instance, human movements that violate
biological laws, such as a finger bending sideways (Costantini
et al., 2005), or a human making robotic movements (Saygin
et al., 2012), significantly disrupt a person’s ability to predict an
agent’s future actions. Thus, sensitivity to biological motion is an
important mechanism for ToM processing, as it alerts a person
not only to agency but bolsters their ability for social action
prediction.
Early in development, infants prefer biological motion over
artificial or scrambled motion (Simion et al., 2008), and prefer
upright over inverted biological motion (Yoon and Johnson,
2009). By the age of two, they are shown to prefer human over
non-human biological motion (Chaminade et al., 2015b). As
demonstrated by a person’s ability to infer emotions (Atkinson
et al., 2004), dispositions (Brownlow and Dixon, 1997), and
intentions (Runeson and Frykholm, 1983) on the basis of
biological motion alone, it is conjectured that recognizing mental
states may substantially rely on perceptions of another’s motor
system honed early in development (Pavlova, 2012).
At a young age children with ASD are shown to be less
sensitive to biological motion compared to NTs. For instance,
young children with ASD do not differentiate between human
and cartoon motion, nor do they prefer artificial or biological
motion (Chaminade et al., 2015b). Young children with ASD also
struggle to differentiate between biological or scrambled motion
when presented in point-light displays (Wang et al., 2015).
Interestingly, research indicates biological motion processing
in ASD may be intact later in development when judging
non-human biological motion. For instance, Rutherford and
Troje (2012), compared adults with ASD to controls on a task
using point light displays depicting human, cat and pigeon
stimuli. While both groups showed an increased ability to
recognize human, then feline, then pigeon motion in a point-
light display, there were significant differences between groups
in their judgments regarding the direction in which the stimuli
were moving. While controls were better able to recognize the
direction of human movements, those with ASD were, in fact,
better able to determine the spatial direction of the pigeon. This
is of particular interest in light of research which indicates that
perception of an agent’s spatial direction is analogous to their
perceived level of animacy; when an individual struggles to orient
to the direction of the stimuli, they are equally diminished in their
perceptions of its animacy (Chang and Troje, 2008).
Kaiser and Shiffrar (2012), measured adults with varying
degrees of ASD traits on their sensitivity to human, dog,
and tractor motion. The magnitude of autistic traits negatively
correlated with sensitivity to human motion alone. This suggests
that deficits attending to and recognizing biological motion
may be specifically impaired with regard to human motion; in
contrast, the perception of anthropomorphic motion appears
intact.
Both SM and CIs patterns in ASD may be responsible for
an insensitivity to human biological motion, and a possibly
intact sensitivity to anthropomorphic biological motion. For
instance, the propensity for NT individuals to “see human,” which
underscores a sensitivity to human biological motion, may be
indicative of increased neural reward activation when processing
human movement. Individuals with ASD, who experience
hypoactivation in reward systems when interacting with human
stimuli (Chaminade et al., 2015a), may, therefore, be less primed
to attend to human biological motion. Indeed, research asking
participants with different degrees of ASD related traits to assign
a value to forms with varying degrees of biological motion found
that those with a higher degree of ASD related traits did not assign
greater value to human biological motion (Williams and Cross,
2018). This may speak to a decreased motivation to closely attend
or engage with purely human stimuli or, equally, an enhanced
interest in human-like or anthropomorphic agents.
With regard to the CIs in ASD, it may also be that the
motion of animate, non-human creatures, represent motion
which is more in line with restricted interests. For instance,
individuals with ASD often show restricted interest in objects
with mechanical movements (Turner-Brown et al., 2011). This
may underlie individuals with ASD’s atypical attribution of
“humanness” to non-biological, mechanical motion observed in
androids (Kumazaki et al., 2017), which in NT’s is viewed as
less salient and significantly disrupts action perception (Saygin
et al., 2012). In this way, individuals with ASD may be both less
sensitive to anomalies in human motion as they are less primed
to process it preferentially (SM), and the atypicality of non-
biological motion, which NTs find unnatural, are of heightened
interest to individuals with ASD (CI).
In summary, an important aspect of ToM is the recognition
of biological motion, which indicates that the bodily movements
of an agent are indicative of human action. Recognizing motion
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as indicative of human movement allows an individual to better
form predictions regarding that agent’s intentions and goal-
directed behaviors. Beginning at an early age, NT infants are
sensitive to human biological motion. Research has found a
different developmental trajectory in young children with ASD,
who do not show a preference for either biological motion or
human agency. This possibly extends throughout adulthood,
though some research indicates that by adulthood individuals
with ASD are better able to recognize human motion in line
with NT adults, though there is some evidence that human
biological motion recognition continues to be impaired (Kaiser
and Pelphrey, 2012).
Interestingly, two studies indicate that biological motion
detection and judgments regarding the direction of biological
motion is not impaired in relation to animal motion; individuals
with ASD related traits have been shown to be impaired only
when attending to human not dog biological motion (Kaiser
and Shiffrar, 2012), and those with ASD are best able to predict
the direction of pigeon rather than human motion, to an even
larger degree than controls (Chang and Troje, 2008). In this way,
the processing and recognition of specifically human biological
motion may be impaired, while perceptions of anthropomorphic
motion may be intact. This may mean that individuals with ASD
have developed a sensitivity for non-human motion in line with
CI, and are less interested in human biological motion in line
with SM.
The finding that biological motion is enhanced when
individuals with ASD view anthropomorphic stimuli
may also correspond to the Epley et al. (2007) model
of anthropomorphism in a similar fashion as findings on
anthropomorphic face processing. In particular, an increased
ability to anthropomorphize anthropomorphic versus human
biological motion may indicate an enhanced social response
toward anthropomorphic creatures, in line with the first
tenet of sociality. In line with the second tenet of enhanced
effectance, if animals represent a restricted interest, individuals
with ASD may display a heightened interest in processing
anthropomorphic stimuli efficiently, and are thus primed to
detect anthropomorphic biological motion. The last of the Epley
et al. (2007) tenets, which states that anthropomorphism occurs
through eliciting agent knowledge, may be particularly at play
in the processing of anthropomorphic biological motion in
ASD. For instance, research indicates that the recognition of
biological motion is enhanced when an individual is able to
map physical aspects of animal motion through the use of a
corresponding human reference (Welsh et al., 2014), such as
relating the bipedal motion of a walking pigeon to that of a
walking human figure. As a physical sensing of the self has been
shown to be impaired in those with ASD (Lombardo et al., 2010)
it may be that a diminished sense of personal motion may lead to
a greater insensitivity to human motion, while not diminishing
a sensitivity to anthropomorphic motion. Indeed, if individuals
with ASD are more attune to animal rather than human stimuli,
as research suggests (Celani, 2002; Prothmann et al., 2009), it
may be that elicited agent knowledge in this population takes
a more anthropomorphic rather than human form. In the
next section, findings relating to increased engagement with
anthropomorphic stimuli in individuals with ASD and how this
related to ToM is discussed.
INCREASED ENGAGEMENT WITH
ANTHROPOMORPHIC STIMULI AND
THEORY OF MIND
It is suggested throughout this review that, be it facial processing
or recognition of biological motion, individuals must experience
some type interest in a stimulus in order to process it socially. The
role of social engagement in anthropomorphism is also central to
the Epley et al. (2007) model, in which a desire for sociality is
cited as the most important determinant of anthropomorphism.
Thus, an underlying argument in this review is that individuals
with ASD may find anthropomorphic stimuli more socially
motivating than human stimuli, which underlies their enhanced
social processing of such stimuli.
Silva et al. (2015) directly tested individuals with ASD
on their broader engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli.
Adolescents and adults with ASD and age-matched controls were
tested on their reaction times when performing the Approach-
Avoidance Task (Rinck and Becker, 2007). In this task, the
participants’ approach or avoidance of either cartoon or human
photographed images were measured by the speed in which
they manipulated pictures of emotionally positive, negative and
neutral social scenes through either the pushing (minimizing
image) or pulling (enlarging) of a joystick. Results showed that
unlike NTs, those with ASD were significantly more avoidant
of emotionally positive photographs, and in contrast found
emotionally positive cartoons significantly more approachable.
Thus, it may be that the heightened anthropomorphism seen
in this population toward anthropomorphic stimuli is reflective
of a desire for sociality, a need which may not be met within
traditional human encounters.
In a study that more closely examined anthropomorphic
engagement and it’s effect on ToM, NT and ASD adolescents were
tested on their ability to recognize emotional expressions in three
types of media (still images, dynamic images, and auditory noise)
across human and cartoon stimuli (Brosnan et al., 2015). Results
showed that NT adolescents were superior to those with ASD in
emotion recognition of human stimuli across all three modalities.
This, however, did not extend to animated (cartoon) stimuli. In
fact, not only did individuals with ASD significantly improve
within group scores on emotion recognition when viewing
cartoon versus human stimuli, they outperformed controls in the
recognition of static cartoon stimuli. However, it is important
to note that accuracy for animated stimuli in the ASD group
was never as high as accuracy for human stimuli in the NT
group, indicating that cartoon presentation does not entirely
compensate for relative ToM-related deficits.
One finding of particular interest related to differences in
processing strategies between groups. The researchers found
that in the control group, emotion recognition for cartoon and
human stimuli were correlated, meaning that the strategies used
by controls in one modality were similarly utilized in others.
However, no such correlations were found within the ASD
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group. This indicates that the manner in which individuals with
ASD were processing cartoon stimuli was not employed when
processing human images, a possible indication that cartoon
stimuli were viewed as “special” while human stimuli were not.
The above research suggests that engagement and motivation
with regard to anthropomorphic stimuli could ameliorate ToM
deficits for those with ASD. One study that tested this was
conducted by Golan et al. (2010), and explored whether
improving ToM by anthropomorphizing non-human agents
could lead to transferable gains in human ToM. In this study,
children with ASD aged 4–7 engaged in a 4-week intervention
in which they watched instructional ToM videos acted out by
toy vehicles grafted with real faces. Following the intervention,
the children were assessed in relation to two control groups, one
with ASD and one without ASD, both of whom did not partake
in the intervention on their ability to generalize learned facial
expressions and utilize emotional vocabulary. Results indicated
that while the experimental group was indistinguishable from the
control ASD group at pre-test, by post-test they had improved
to the level of the control group on all four measures. Central
to these findings was the children’s demonstrated ability to
generalize content to not only novel anthropomorphic stimuli
but novel human stimuli. This indicates that the intrinsic interest
individuals with ASD showed toward areas of restricted interest
may have promoted their interest and understanding in human
stimuli.
In relation to the Epley et al. (2007) model, anthropomorphic
stimuli may enhance sociality, increase the desire for effectance,
and is not viewed as incongruent with the physical self.
The following section will focus on the second tenet of
the model, in which it is found that a desire for efficacy
promotes anthropomorphism. Studies documenting an increased
desire for efficacy in individuals with ASD when processing
anthropomorphic characters due to stylization/exaggeration,
and extensive previous experiences with such stimuli, will be
explored.
EFFECTANCE WITH
STYLIZATION/EXAGGERATION
As previously discussed, research indicates that individuals
anthropomorphize in order to increase their efficacy in
understanding a non-human entity and this is enhanced when
behavior is less predictable (Waytz et al., 2010b). One aspect
of anthropomorphic stimuli that may particularly increase
effectance of individuals with ASD is the stylization and
exaggeration of social features in such agents, which may
highlight a sense of unpredictability regarding their intentions.
Support for this comes from research showing that within
this population the recognition of changes in emotion may
be impaired, while the perception of changes in motion is
intact (Han et al., 2015). This may mean that the exaggerated
movements used by anthropomorphic characters to express
emotions may be more noticeable to those with the condition,
while changes in emotion may be missed and thus not utilized
when making judgments of unpredictability.
Research on animal movement, for instance, indicates that
individuals largely rely on physical movements, such as the
motion of the tail and muzzle cues like the baring teeth, when
identifying an animal’s mental state (Tami and Gallagher, 2009).
Thus individuals with ASD may be better equipped to attend
to animal emotion, as it involves the interpretation of overt
movement rather than subtle changes in facial expression. In
this way, the unpredictability of animal agents may be more
noticeable, thus leading to a greater desire for effectance. Cartoon
characters are also characterized by exaggerated motion (Thomas
et al., 1995), which serves to direct attention toward socially
relevant aspects of the animation (Gielniak and Thomaz, 2012).
In a similar way to animal agents, individuals with ASD may be
more primed to attend to the unpredictability of cartoon motion
as it is exaggerated and thus more salient.
Carter et al. (2016) provides preliminary support for the
hypothesis that exaggerated motion in anthropomorphic stimuli
increases interest in effectance. In this study, children with ASD
interacted with animated avatars with varying degrees of facial
emotional exaggeration. When an avatar showed exaggerated
facial motion, compared to dampened or realistic motion,
nonverbal behaviors such as gaze or gesturing significantly
increased. This is in line with research showing that individuals
with ASD are less impaired when interpreting overt emotional
expressions, and struggle more with the detection of subtle
facial emotional changes (Rump et al., 2009). Anthropomorphic
faces, which exaggeration makes more emotionally intense (Hyde
et al., 2014), may heighten their unpredictability and lead to
a greater desire for effectance, while subtle changes in realistic
human agents are less salient, and result in a decreased desire for
effectance.
EFFECTANCE FROM CARTOON AND
ANIMAL EXPERIENCE
Cartoon Experience
An important aspect of the desire for effectance brought up in
Epley et al. (2007) is people anthropomorphize out of a desire
for ‘closure’ or understanding of an agent. One reason that
individuals with ASD may anthropomorphize cartoon stimuli
more than human stimuli is that familiarity with such content
has led to an increased sense of self-efficacy in understanding
such stimuli. Heightened interest and time spent attending to
animated stimuli is well documented in this population. For
instance, survey data shows that adolescents with ASD spend a
significant amount of time engaging with electronic screen media
(Mazurek et al., 2012). Surveys given to parents of children with
ASD indicate that electronic screen engagement is their most
common leisure activity, in particular animated television shows
and movies (Shane and Albert, 2008). Kuo et al. (2014) also found
that within a sample of adolescents with ASD, cartoon television
programs were the most popular television genre, and 66% of the
sample reported a preference for animation over any other type
of media.
Drawing a causal relation between cartoon viewing and
increased ToM abilities with regard to cartoon stimuli remains
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ambiguous. As has been discussed previously in this review, there
are reasons why the stylized exaggeration inherent to animated
media may attract individuals with ASD to this medium. For
one, the exaggerated and amplified motion may allow for greater
success when making ToM judgments, leading to enhanced self-
efficacy and thus greater enjoyment of this type of media. As
individuals with ASD report increased familiarity and exposure
to this form of media, it may be that they have an increased
expertise in processing cartoon stimuli, which has led to the type
of FFA activation that enhances ToM related processing. This
may increase a desire for effectance in relation to cartoons, as
individuals with ASD may feel better equipped to understand
the meaning behind the social acts depicted in cartoon form due
to their increased exposure, thus increasing their tendency to
anthropomorphize (Epley et al., 2007).
Animal Experience
Individuals with ASD also show increased motivation and
experience regarding animal stimuli. For instance, Celani
(2002) compared children with ASD to NTs, and those with
intellectual disabilities, on their preferences for human, animal
and object stimuli. While children with ASD significantly
preferred objects over human stimuli, they showed a significantly
greater preference for animals than all other types of stimuli.
Prothmann et al. (2009) showed children with ASD interacted
significantly more frequently and for a longer duration with a
dog than a person or toy, when through a free-choice paradigm.
Both provide evidence of an implicit preference in individuals
with ASD for animal stimuli, which may motivate attention to
animals over humans.
With regard to animal experience, it is estimated that 1 in 4
children with ASD have participated in animal therapy at some
point, and two-thirds of parents report improvements following
animal-assisted interventions (Christon et al., 2010). Research
also indicates that families of children with ASD may have
a particularly high rate of pet ownership, as 81% of families
with a child with ASD surveyed on pet ownership reported
owning pets (Carlisle, 2014), while the national average is around
66% according to the American Veterinary Medical Association
[AVMA] (2012). Further findings in this study indicated that 94%
of children with ASD were described by parents as having bonded
with their pets, with common bonding activities including talking
and actively playing and petting their pets. Parents commonly
reported that they believed pets provided specific benefits to their
children with regard to alleviating common challenges related to
ASD, and 26% of parents reported that the perceived benefits of
animal contact on ASD symptoms factored into their decision to
own a pet, particularly dogs. Surveys of individuals with ASD also
indicates strong perceived attachments between themselves and
their pets (Carlisle, 2015).
Together, these results indicate that not only do individuals
with ASD commonly have extensive contact with animals but that
these encounters are viewed quite positively by both themselves
and close others. Given that individuals with ASD often report
a significantly high degree of negative social experiences (White
et al., 2011; Lamport and Turner, 2014), and decreased social
self-efficacy (Vickerstaff et al., 2007), successful encounters with
animals may increase a desire for effectance, as previous positive
encounters with animals may have incentivized understanding
animal agents (Epley et al., 2007).
Considering this evidence, it appears that individuals with
ASD on average tend to have frequent and positive experiences
interacting with animals and cartoons, either through media
engagement, structured animal-assisted interventions, pet-
ownership, or all three. In this way, the positive social experiences
individuals with ASD have had with regard to anthropomorphic
agents may lead to greater motivation to interact effectively
with such stimuli. As individuals with ASD have experienced
social reward associated in particular with animal engagement,
anthropomorphizing animals may happen out of a desire to
further understand and predict the behavior of this stimuli.
Additionally, a heightened exposure to cartoons may lead
individuals with ASD to view understanding the mental states
of cartoons as within their control. In contrast, it may be that
individuals with ASD view the processing of human stimuli as
less in their control, and they show decreased anthropomorphism
for human agents.
SUMMARY
The processing of mental states is a complex, multi-faceted
procedure that requires lower-level inputs in order to produce
higher-order ToM explanations. Individuals with ASD have been
shown to struggle with ToM throughout development, and
evidence suggests that lower-level processing impairments such
as reduced facial and biological motion processing may play a
significant role in this disruption. In particular, it appears that
individuals with ASD have early insensitivities to human agency,
namely attending to human faces and human biological motion.
While evidence suggests that individuals with ASD show
significant deficits in relation to recognizing and processing
human stimuli, they are conversely shown to display a heightened
interest in non-social stimuli compared to NTs. The SM and CI
aspects of ASD complement one another in their explanations of
these deficits. In relation to SM, early deficits in relation to human
social processing, which primes NTs to preferentially attend to
such stimuli through an associated neural reward system, is
impaired in those with ASD. This may lead to decreased reward
circuitry, and thus less holistic and preferential processing of
human stimuli, which impairs ToM processing at lower levels
of input. Additionally, the preference individuals with ASD
show toward non-social stimuli (CI), particularly objects in the
environment that have ordered motion or systems, may reflect
a preference to attend to items of restricted interests in place of
social stimuli. In this way, the increased motivation to attend
to non-social stimuli may impact the motivation to attend to
less-ordered, more complex social stimuli.
However, the many studies detailed in this review indicate
that engagement with anthropomorphic stimuli may function as
a bridge for individuals with ASD to attend to social stimuli.
In line with SM, it is hypothesized that the developed stressors
associated with human contact may not extend to human-
like stimuli. In this way, individuals with ASD may be more
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motivated to attend to anthropomorphic stimuli in typical ways,
as anthropomorphic stimuli feature properties that differentiate
them from purely human agents. It is also hypothesized that as
individuals with ASD are able to attend to motion, and struggle
with the nuances of emotion, an ability to decode animal and
cartoon emotion using overt movement cues could make social
processing less difficult, thereby enhancing SM. The frequent
exposure to cartoons and animal agents may also serve to
enhance motivational engagement with such stimuli.
Also playing an important role in anthropomorphic social
processing is found in aspects of CIs in those with ASD.
Properties of anthropomorphic agents that correspond to
restricted interests, including stylized physical properties and an
association with an exaggerated motion, may direct attention
to these agents over and above agents that are purely human.
For instance, individuals with ASD report an enhanced interest
and experience with cartoon stimuli, and the overt, exaggerated
aspects of cartoon motion may be particularly salient. In this way,
anthropomorphic agents may represent an area of expertise for
individuals with ASD, therefore enhancing their ability to attend
to them holistically.
For these reasons, it is suggested that while the social
processing of human stimuli appears to be impaired in
this population, the processing of anthropomorphic stimuli
is either less pronounced, intact or even enhanced. Thus,
using anthropomorphic stimuli to develop social processing
in individuals with ASD may help ameliorate a decreased
motivation to engage with human stimuli. It may also aid
individuals with ASD in the processing of social over non-
social stimuli, as anthropomorphic creatures are social agents,
yet they also possess physical characteristics reminiscent of
restricted, non-social interests. The implications of these findings
are discussed below.
IMPLICATIONS
There are several important implications for the increased
social processing of anthropomorphic stimuli in individuals
with ASD. Chief among them is the possibility that increasing
social cognitive development in relation to anthropomorphic
stimuli may serve as a scaffold for transferring these skills
to human stimuli. There is some evidence that supports
this claim. For instance, Golan et al. (2010) showed that
improvements understanding mental state language in
connection to anthropomorphic characters transferred to
social gains with human stimuli. This indicates that the use of
areas of CI when combined with human elements may help
improve ToM when interacting with non-CI related agents.
Research on animal-assisted interventions such as equine
therapy indicates that skills learned with animal agents
transferred to real life social improvements even when measured
1-month post-trial (Gabriels et al., 2015). Studies measuring
naturalistic social improvements also show that in the presence
of animals, real-life social functioning can improve, and
importantly lead to greater peer acceptance (O’Haire et al.,
2013). These studies indicate that the enhanced social processing,
and the motivation experienced by individuals in relation to
anthropomorphic stimuli, may transfer to improvements in
human interactions.
Perhaps most significant is the possibility that perceived
self-efficacy with anthropomorphic stimuli can lead to gains
in perceived self-efficacy in relation to humans, and human
encounters. Underlying the “eye avoidance” hypothesis of ASD
(Tanaka and Sung, 2016) is that individuals with ASD develop
gaze aversion in relation to human contact, as they may implicitly
equate eye gaze with social demands that they cannot meet. For
instance, evidence shows that in preschool there is not the same
aversion to mutual gaze and emotional dysregulation in children
with ASD (Nuske et al., 2015), and 2-year-old children with ASD
show eye indifference rather than eye avoidance, as they can be
primed to view eyes (Moriuchi et al., 2016).
However, research also indicates that in adults with ASD there
is a distinct aversion to direct eye-gaze (Kliemann et al., 2012),
and that direct eye gaze results in hyperactivation in subcortical
areas of the brain, indicating dysregulation (Hadjikhani et al.,
2017). This may indicate that early eye indifference later results
in eye avoidance, leading to a possibility that commensurate
with age, individuals with ASD may develop a human-specific
social aversion. In contrast, early eye insensitivity may not
impact individuals with ASD’s perceived self-efficacy with
anthropomorphic agents. In this way, the negative associations
that may impede further development of social processing in
relation to human stimuli may not interfere with development
in regard to anthropomorphic social processing. This reflects
theories of ASD relating to social compensation (Livingston
and Happé, 2017), and it may be that the difficulties associated
with human agents are compensated for when interacting with
non-human agents.
With regard to compensation, it may be that an ability
to process anthropomorphic social cues creates a pathway to
developing social processing competencies, and this may be a
bridge to developing competencies with human stimuli. For
instance, research indicates that the same brain regions are
recruited when individuals use ToM in relation to animals as
they do in relation to humans (Desmet et al., 2017), and those
facial expressions in both animals and humans are processed
similarly (Schirmer et al., 2013). Interestingly, research indicates
that when assessing the emotions of dogs, individuals often
used their own emotions as a template (Konok et al., 2015).
In this way, engagement with mentalizing about animals may
lead to increased processing of personal emotions, which has
been shown to be impaired in individuals with ASD (Jackson
et al., 2012), and thus may be an important mechanism for
ToM improvement (Allan et al., 2017). Effective reasoning about
anthropomorphic social agents may, therefore, transfer to efficacy
with human agents and even efficacy in understanding the self.
There are several implications for interventions with regard
to enhanced social processing for anthropomorphism. One is
that, in line with Golan et al. (2010), it may be advantageous to
use anthropomorphic stimuli when engaging individuals with
ASD in ToM interventions. In particular, future interventions
of this nature should focus on scaffolding, and slowly applying
strategies toward more human-like stimuli presentations.
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It is also of interest to examine how longitudinal interventions
with anthropomorphic stimuli may differentially affect what may
be a developed aversion to human stimuli in older individuals
with ASD.
In particular, O’Haire et al. (2013) indicates that interactions
with animals by both children with ASD and NTs in a classroom
setting enhances social reciprocity. It may be that structuring
inclusive classroom settings to involve animal contact may
improve social outcomes for individuals with ASD and foster
greater peer acceptance. This may help counteract some of
the negative social experiences often reported by individuals
with ASD, and lead to greater self-efficacy in relation to social
encounters. Experiential accounts from individuals with ASD
often report attachment and elevated self-esteem in relation to
anthropomorphic agents, particularly animals. It may be that
anthropomorphism for this population allows those with ASD to
experience social engagement in a way that feels more natural,
and thus can aid in transferable ToM gains to other social
settings.
In closing, the Epley et al. (2007) model of anthropomorphism
uses three tenets to explain why people anthropomorphize. It is
suggested that individuals with ASD may use anthropomorphic
creatures as a social outlet of sorts, and in this way, a desire
to see the social aspects of anthropomorphic creatures leads to
better holistic processing of this stimuli. Individuals with ASD
may also have a greater desire to understand anthropomorphic
creatures, as they have had success understanding and interacting
with such agents, and the agents have properties related to
CIs, which enhances a desire for effectance. Additionally, a
decreased salience for humans and an increased salience for
anthropomorphic characters, perhaps tied to exaggerated motion
and a poor detection of emotion, may lead to a stronger
recognition of unpredictability, thus enhancing a desire for
effectance with anthropomorphic creatures. Finally, individuals
with ASD have a diminished physical sense of self and are less
sensitive to anomalies in the human form. While this impedes
anthropomorphizing non-human creatures in those who are NT,
this may not lead to the same types of processing deficits in
individuals with ASD. Conversely, the aspects of the physical self
that, in individuals with ASD, are less salient or noticeable, may
lead to a heightened identification with other “more than human”
and thus more exaggerated stimuli.
At present, investigations into anthropomorphism have
found that ToM impairments correspond to impairments
anthropomorphizing (Cullen et al., 2014). It may be of
interest to examine whether this is unilaterally the case
with individuals with ASD. For instance, research shows
that in anthropomorphic assessments using animated shapes,
individuals with ASD are less able to anthropomorphize (Abell
et al., 2000). However, it may be that with more socially
enriched stimuli, such as animal or human cartoon stimuli,
individuals with ASD may display a different pattern with
regard to anthropomorphism and ToM. Additionally, as is
explored by Brosnan et al. (2015), deficits relating to ToM
may be ameliorated when stimuli take a less human form.
It would be of particular interest to test whether this can
be replicated, particularly through the use of non-visual ToM
paradigms, in order to assess the purely cognitive aspects
of mental state representations and their connection with
anthropomorphism in this population. It would also be of
interest to further understand how anthropomorphism and self-
perceptions interact in ASD, and whether anthropomorphism
can serve as a pathway for improving intrapersonal as well as
interpersonal social processing, and ToM more generally.
In conclusion we have highlighted how the ability to
anthropomorphize may not only be intact in those with ASD, but
those with the condition may even display a particular affinity
for seeing human in the non-human. Evidence suggests that
ToM abilities, which are usually disrupted in this population,
may be ameliorated, spared, or even enhanced when they are
directed toward anthropomorphic rather than human agents. As
we have shown, anthropomorphizing may be a potential scaffold
for improving ToM abilities more generally in this population,
as they correspond with a number of strengths intrinsic to ASD.
Identifying and capitalizing on such strengths may be the key to
improving ToM, and allowing those with ASD better integration
within the wider social world.
I moved full circle form being a wild thing out of context as a
child, to being a wild thing in context with a family of gorillas, who
taught me how to be civilized. They taught me the beauty of being
wild and gentle together as one (Prince-Hughes, 2004, p. 1).
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